I believe there's a phenomenology -a "what it's like" -of occurrent conscious thought.
Amen.
1 I'll call the view that there's a proprietary, individuative phenomenology of occurrent conscious thought the phenomenal intentionality of thought thesis (PITT, for short). Not many people believe PITT. But skepticism about it seems to me more often based on prior theoretical commitment, or overreaching confidence in the explanatory resources of contemporary Naturalism (what Charles Siewert calls "the tyrannizing anxieties and ambitions of mind-body metaphysics"), than on unbiased reflection upon our conscious mental lives, or careful evaluation of the arguments in its favor.
In this paper I consider three more reasoned lines of resistance to PITT, the first advanced by Joe Levine (this volume), the second taking its cue from extrospectionist views of selfknowledge, and the third stemming from concerns about introspective availability of intentional content. I argue that none of these challenges poses a serious threat to the thesis that the intentionality of thought is proprietarily phenomenally constituted.
I begin, however, with a new argument for cognitive phenomenology.
II.
Sameness and difference within consciousness are entirely phenomenally constituted.
Conscious experiences of, for example, (particular shades of) yellow and green are, qua conscious, 2 of different kinds in virtue of their distinctive phenomenologies -the different the only way we can know what they are and that they are different from each other, but because, qua conscious, this is the only way for them to be what they are, and to be different from one another.
III.
In his contribution to this volume, Joe Levine maintains that the argument from selfknowledge in PC doesn't establish that there's a proprietary phenomenology of cognition, since the kinds of self-knowledge it's introduced to explain can be explained without it. In responding to Levine's objections, I hope to clarify and improve the argument.
Levine begins by making a distinction between implicit and explicit self-knowledge of thought.
Implicit self-knowledge is not the result of any explicit formulation or reflection. Rather, it's the knowledge that seems to come with the very thinking of the thought itself. ... All that's required is that one thinks in one's language of thought, mentalese.
To implicitly know what one is thinking is just to think with understanding.
[cite]
Explicit self-knowledge, in contrast, is what we have when we explicitly formulate a meta-cognitive thought, such as "I believe that San Francisco is a beautiful city." [cite] and is explicable in terms of the reliability of the relevant process yielding the higher-order sentence expressing the fact that one is thinking a certain content. [cite] He maintains that implicit and explicit self-knowledge, so construed, are all we need to explain self-knowledge of thought, and that neither requires a special phenomenology of cognition.
Now, I accept a distinction between implicit and explicit self-knowledge; but I don't think it can do the work it's supposed to do if it's understood in Levine's terms. For one thing, mere occurrence of a mental state can't constitute implicit self-knowledge of the relevant kind unless the occurrence is conscious, and consciousness requires phenomenology. Moreover, without characteristic phenomenal differences among occurrent conscious states, implicit selfknowledge couldn't be discriminative. Implicit knowledge of experience requires implicit individuation of experiences, which, in consciousness, is always purely phenomenal. One can't implicitly know what one is experiencing unless the experience is implicitly discriminated in consciousness from all others. Hence, there must be a proprietary, distinctive and individuative phenomenology of conscious thoughts if one is to have implicit knowledge of them.
And I still think the reliable-mechanism account of explicit self-knowledge is inadequate. like to taste uni), even if I didn't know it was uni I was tasting. Knowledge by acquaintance of a mental state, on the other hand, is knowing that one is in it, and requires application of concepts and formation of beliefs. If, after my first, innocent taste of uni, someone tells me that it was uni I ate, then I can know that I am tasting (or have tasted) uni, and that I know what uni tastes like.
Moreover, neither sort of knowledge can be reduced to the other; and knowledge by acquaintance (knowledge-that) presupposes acquaintance-knowledge (knowledge what).
When Mary leaves the black and white room, she comes to know what it's like to see red when she experiences it. In having the experience of red, she acquaintance-knows what seeing red is like. If she's re-imprisoned and her memory fades, then she'll no longer have this kind of knowledge -she'll no longer know what it's like to see red. Further, Mary's first experience of red would not constitute implicit knowledge if it weren't conscious, since if it weren't conscious it would make no difference to her (she couldn't be said to be acquainted with it). If her color experiences upon her release from the black and white room were unconscious, she would notice no relevant changes in her experience, and couldn't be said to have learned anything new. She where an instance of a phenomenal property is the referent (or a constituent 4 ) of the demonstrative concept 'this', since one may have an experience of red, and thus acquaintanceknow what it's like to see red, without being able to categorize it conceptually -i.e., without 4 Some philosophers maintain that demonstrative 'phenomenal concepts' have sample experiences embedded in them, and are thus partly self-referential (see Chalmers 2003) . Before she has experienced red, Mary can't have this sort of concept, and so can't know that red looks like this. I prefer a view on which concepts and sensations are kept separate, so that the thoughts Mary might have in the technicolor vestibule (the brightly colored antechamber containing no recognizable objects that she's released into before getting out into the world (see Nida-Rümelin 1995)) I wonder if red looks like this (demonstrating a red patch) and I wonder if red looks like this (demonstrating a green patch) have the same conceptual content, but different truth conditions due to the different referents of 'this'. (I defend a general account of demonstratives and indexicals along these lines in Pitt MS1.) being able to think that one is experiencing red, or that this is what it's like to experience red. This may be because one lacks the appropriate concept (which may be because it's not in the human repertoire), or because one doesn't know how to apply it to one's experience. As NidaRümelin (1995) No doubt Levine will consider all of this question-begging, since he maintains that we can be "as it were, magically" aware of our occurrent conscious thoughts (i.e. (I suppose), we're privy to the results of a computational process, but not to the process itself), without invoking "perceptual-like appearance." A conscious thought occurs; a mechanism that can register which thought it is causes me to believe that it's that thought (tokens "a mentalese sentence that expresses the fact that one is" thinking it), and if the mechanism is reliable, the belief will count as knowledge. There's no work here for a phenomenology of cognition to do. But it's not the case that we always just "magically" know what we're thinking or feeling.
We often recognize what we're thinking or feeling, identify it on the basis of its recognizable properties, and self-ascribe it. We make voluntary judgments about the contents of our consciousness on the basis of recognition of their distinctive phenomenologies. We're consciously aware, not just that we're in a particular conscious state, but of the state itself.
Sometimes I come to have a belief about what I'm experiencing on the basis of attending to it and recognizing what it is. This is the kind of self-knowledge the argument in PC is concerned to explain. Maybe there's a reflex "I'm in pain!" that pops into my head when something hurts me.
But I can also, so to speak, browse around in my conscious mind (selectively attend to the contents of my consciousness) and attend to things that are there (the song that's been in my head all day, the ringing in my ears, the thought that Hell is other people). I may or may not form the thought that I'm in any of these states; but if I do, it seems that I can do it voluntarily -just as I might absent-mindedly (thoughtlessly) be looking at a yellow flower, and then think to myself: "That's a yellow flower." The automatic belief-forming mechanism story can't explain this.
The issue between me and Levine isn't whether or not there are conscious experiences, or whether or not we can have introspective knowledge of their occurrence and nature. We agree on this. Our difference concerns, rather, how beliefs about experience are formed. Levine claims that they're always formed by a reliable, automatic belief-forming mechanism. My claim is that, whether or not there are beliefs about experience formed in this way, we can also voluntarily form beliefs about our conscious experiences on the basis of active introspection, and that this presupposes that we have some way of identifying and distinguishing them from each other, qua conscious. But the only properties of conscious experiences that can serve to distinguish them qua conscious are phenomenal properties (because these are the only intrinsic properties that conscious experiences as such can have). So, given that it's possible to gain selfknowledge of thought in this way, there must be a distinctive phenomenology for thoughts -a cognitive phenomenology. The activity of an automatic belief-forming mechanism cannot, qua automatic, explain this sort of self-knowledge.
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Further, even in cases where a computational mechanism "magically" informs me what state I'm in, by producing a thought about it in the appropriate way, there's still a need for distinctive cognitive phenomenology. For, unless I know what the mechanism has "said" -if, so to speak, I can't read the memo that's on the "belief board" -I won't know what state I'm in.
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Even if the meta-cognitive belief is implicit -its mere occurrence on the belief board constituting implicit knowledge of its occurrence and content, there's still a need for a distinctive cognitive phenomenology. As argued above, implicit conscious knowledge requires individuative phenomenology. Implicit knowledge that I'm consciously thinking that p (and not that q, r, s, ...), like implicit knowledge of any other sort of conscious mental state, requires a distinctive phenomenology. So the automatic belief-forming mechanism story doesn't really provide an 5 It would, I think, be very odd to suppose that all of our knowledge of our conscious occurrent sensory states is automatic, since this would render the phenomenology of such states irrelevant to our knowledge of them -we might come to know that, for example, we're hearing the dinner bell in the absence of conscious auditory phenomenology. It seems much more plausible that one recognizes the sound of the dinner bell, and on that basis comes to believe that the dinner bell has rung. 6 Especially if the message is in mentalese, which no one can read or understand.
alternative to the phenomenally-based account. It doesn't explain everything that needs to be explained.
IV.
A [I]n making a self-ascription of belief, one's eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed outward -upon the world. If someone asks me "Do you think there is going to be a third world war?," I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena I would attend to if I were answering the question "Will there be a third world war?"
Evans's view has recently been developed by Richard Moran, in his book Authority and Estrangement. 11 Moran generalizes Evans's claim, and couches it explicitly in terms of 9 Proponents are reduced to talk of representation of uninstantiated universals and objects in non-actual possible worlds, neither of which seem to me to be representable in the right sort of way, or to have the right sort of properties. (What is deferred perception of such things?) 10 I'll use the phrase 'intentional content' to refer to the contents of cognitive/ conceptual states such as thoughts, beliefs and desires. Some philosophers think that non-conceptual states have intentional content as well; but I won't be discussing such states in these terms here.
11 I am indebted in this section to Alex Byrne's discussion of Moran's views in Byrne 2005 , from which I've also taken the Evans and Moran quotations.
transparency:
With respect to the attitude of belief, the claim of transparency tells us that the firstperson question "Do I believe P?" is "transparent" to, answered in the same way as, the outward-directed question as to the truth of P itself. [Moran 2001: 66] Here, as in the case of perceptual experience, one determines the contents of one's mental states by looking outward. If you want to know if you believe that justice is a virtue, don't look into your mind, but consider justice and its relation to virtue. Now, Byrne (2005) has argued persuasively that Evans-Moran-style views, on which self-knowledge of belief is achieved by a process akin to decision-making, can't be the complete story.
12 As Byrne points out, there are many cases in which, when asked what one believes, one already knows the answer, and, therefore, doesn't have to figure it out:
Consider the question "Do I live in Cambridge, Massachusetts?" or "Do I believe that Moran is the author of Authority and Estrangement?" These questions can be answered transparently, by considering the relevant facts of location and authorship, but I do not need to make up my mind. On the contrary, it is already made up.
[85]
Byrne concludes that transparency, per se, "does not show that knowledge of one's beliefs is in general a matter of making up one's mind" (85). He then goes on to develop an extrospectionist account of self-knowledge which, he claims, avoids the Evans-Moran limitation and explains both privileged and peculiar access to one's own intentional states.
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On Byrne's view, one comes to know what one believes by applying to oneself (or at least trying to apply to oneself) the transparent epistemic rule BEL (95): (BEL) If p, believe that you believe that p typically, not a proposition about oneself or one's mental state. One looks outward to determine the status of p, and recognizing it to be true, applies the rule and believes that one believes that p.
But how is it that considering whether or not it is the case that p, where p concerns facts not about oneself but about a mind-independent world, can support attributions of mental states to oneself? This is the "puzzle of transparency." As Byrne puts it (95), it seems that "surely
[BEL] is a bad rule: that p is the case does not even make it likely that one believes that it is the case." Here one seems to be in the same situation with respect to oneself as one is with respect to others. BEL, it would seem, is just as bad as BEL-3 (96):
Determining the truth value of p won't help at all in coming to know what Fred believes.
Byrne claims that the solution to the puzzle of transparency lies in the fact that " [o] ne is only in a position to follow BEL ... when one has recognized that p. And recognizing that p is (inter alia) coming to believe that p" (96). 14 That is, the only conditions under which BEL can be applied to yield self-knowledge are those in which the that-clause of its consequent is true: one must recognize that p, where recognizing that p entails believing that p. Hence, BEL is self- 14 Simply entertaining the proposition that p isn't sufficient, since one can think that p without believing it. Suppose someone says "George W Bush was the greatest American president." You, incredulous, think: George W Bush was the greatest American president. I don't believe that. (You probably had to think it to understand what was said in the first place. Clearly, however, you don't have to believe what someone says in order to understand it.) This isn't paradoxical. The thought: p. I don't believe that p is paradoxical only if it is assumed that the initial p is an (inner) expression of a belief. (Likewise, the sentence 'p. I don't believe that p' isn't paradoxical. If 'p, but/and I don't believe that p' is paradoxical, it is (I would argue) because 'but' or 'and' somehow implies that the first utterance of 'p' is an assertion. Not all utterances of declarative sentences are assertions.)
verifying. p may be a mind-independent fact, but that one recognizes that p is not; it's a psychological fact about oneself, and as such justifies a psychological conclusion. In making cognitive contact with the fact that p, one licenses the inference to an explicit self-attribution of a psychological state -in a way that making cognitive contact with p would not license attribution of a psychological state to Fred. Given that one is in the proper circumstances -the circumstances of recognizing that p -one is justified in applying the rule and inferring (the thatclause of) its consequent.
But now it seems BEL is no longer transparent. For, in order to apply it, you have to know that you're in the proper circumstances. It's one thing to be in the proper circumstancesfor there to be a justification for the application of BEL; but if you don't know that you are -if you don't know that you have such justification, then you have no reason -no motivation -for applying the rule. Byrne likens application of BEL when one recognizes that p to application of the rule of necessitation (p → p) "whenever one is in circumstances in which the rule applieswhenever, that is, one is confronted with a proof whose initial premises are axioms." (95) But just as you would have no reason to infer p from p unless you knew that p was occurring in a proof whose initial premises are axioms (why not infer ¬q, as you would if p appeared in a proof below a line on which ¬p appeared, under assumption of q?), you would have no reason to infer that you believe that p from the recognition that p unless you knew that you recognized that p. In the absence of such knowledge, you'd have no more reason for applying BEL to yourself than you'd have to apply BEL-3 to Fred. 15 But knowing that you recognize that p is knowing that you're in a psychological state; and so BEL is not transparent. 16 Moreover, given that recognizing that p is, as Byrne notes, inter alia, believing that p, knowing that one is in a position to apply BEL is already knowing that one believes that p. But
that's what's supposed to be achieved by the application of BEL. Byrne claims that "the puzzle of transparency is solved by noting that BEL is self-verifying" (96). But the puzzle isn't solved, since one isn't really looking outward after all. Moreover, the explanatory value of the theory is lost, since application of BEL presupposes the knowledge it's supposed to generate: the theory is viciously circular.
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It might be objected that one need not recognize that one is in proper circumstances for application of BEL in order to apply it and come to know what one believes, because its 15 Of course there can be a reason to apply a rule that one isn't aware of. But such lack of awareness would prevent one from applying it. The fact that a crane is about to drop a concert grand on the street right where I will be in ten seconds is a reason for me to cross the street. But if I don't know this -if I don't know that I'm in a situation in which the rule 'If you are about to be crushed by a piano falling from a crane, cross the street, quickly' is applicable -in the absence of some other motivation, I won't cross the street; I won't apply the rule. I will, in a perfectly ordinary sense, have no reason to. 16 Or, more precisely, BEL', which makes explicit the conditions one must be in in order for application of BEL to yield self-knowledge, is not transparent:
(BEL') If you recognize that p, believe that you believe that p BEL itself is transparent, in that its antecedent is neutral (contains no psychological terms); but Byrne's solution to the puzzle of transparency entails that BEL can't be transparently applied.
17 Though I have focused on Byrne's account, I think these problems arise for any theory (including extrospectionist accounts of perceptual self-knowledge -more on this below) that relies on transparency. The general problem is that external facts are only relevant when they're cognized, and one must know the way in which they're cognized in order to draw any inference about one's psychological state. But knowledge of the way in which they're cognized is what the inference is supposed to yield. application is automatic: whenever you're in the circumstances of recognizing that p, some mechanism that implements BEL is activated, and forthwith you believe that you believe that p.
Simply being in the proper circumstances is sufficient to trigger the relevant mechanism; it isn't necessary that one consciously recognize that one is, or self-consciously apply BEL, in order for application of BEL to yield self-knowledge. My objection relies on an internalist conception of justification, which is not inevitable.
But the sorts of cases Byrne is trying to explain are not automatic. He's concerned with a process in which one considers how things are, applies BEL, and concludes that one believes that p -a conscious, voluntary process of coming to know what one believes. (Note that the consequent of BEL is an imperative -an instruction to do something, and that this is something one may try to do and succeed in doing.) Surely this is one way to come to know what one believes. Whether or not there's a mechanism of the other kind, its operation can't explain such a process.
Moreover, mechanizing the inference doesn't obviate the transparency and circularity problems. Given that the mechanism needs as input not just the content that p, which could be believed, doubted, hoped, etc., but, again, the mode in which it's cognized, the rule it implements would have to have the form of (something like) AUTO-BEL':
(AUTO-BEL') If that p is recognized, dump a token of 'I believe that p' into the belief box the antecedent of which isn't about the world -the fact that p -but about the psychological state of recognizing that p. Hence, even if the inference is automatic (and/or unconscious), the implemented rule isn't transparent. Its antecedent refers to a psychological state.
Further, whether the inference is voluntary or automatic, the conditions under which the rule is applicable must be represented somewhere in the system. If there are a number of such mechanisms, each putting out a different kind of attitude with potentially the same content (belief that p, fear that p, hope that p, ...), they'll each require information about the mode in which the content is cognized -whether it's built into the rule explicitly, as in AUTO-BEL', or encoded somewhere "upstream" in some kind of input sorting mechanism, or otherwise represented.
Without this information, the system won't "know" which routine to run, any more than a conscious, voluntary user of the rule. So the automated account is just as circular as the voluntary one: it requires that in order to come to know what you believe, you must already know (be in possession of information concerning) what you believe.
It might be countered that the "knowing" of the subpersonal system and the knowing of the believer are sufficiently different to render the account non-circular. The state the automaton is in is not a psychological state -it's not the very state the believer comes to be in when the routine is run. But whether or not the state is properly called psychological, it must carry information in some form about content and attitude if it is to play a role in the causation of the second-order belief. And this is sufficient to render the account circular.
Analogous non-transparency and circularity problems afflict Byrne's (Fullerton) Moreover, given the intimate connection that, according to Byrne, obtains between judging that ϕing would be desirable and wanting to ϕ, the account suffers from circularity as much as the account based on BEL. Byrne maintains that the relation between judging that something would be desirable and wanting to do it is, though not necessary (like the relation between recognizing and believing), close enough to make DES "strongly reliably self-verifying" (slide 21). However, if this is so, then the fact that one must know that one believes that ϕing would be desirable in order to be justified in applying DES is sufficient to render the account 19 Of course if it were the case that something is desirable if and only if one desires it, DES itself (not just its application conditions) would be circular, since it would be equivalent to DES': (DES') If you desire to ϕ, believe that you desire to ϕ This construal of desirability is controversial, however. Suppose it therefore incorrect for the purposes of this discussion. circular. You can't conclude that you want to ϕ unless you know that you believe that ϕing would be desirable; and believing that ϕing would be desirable is sufficiently close to wanting to ϕ that knowing that the former is true is already knowing that the latter is true.
The same sorts of problems would confront an effort to apply this approach to selfknowledge that one was merely thinking -as opposed to believing, desiring, etc. Suppose I come upon you, frowning and staring off into space, and ask: "What's up? Why so glum?" and you answer, "I was just thinking about inner-sense and Byrne-style extrospectionist accounts of self-knowledge of belief." ("Oh. I'm sorry," I reply.) How is it that you knew what you were doing -that you were thinking about something? Should we say that you applied the transparent epistemic rule TNK?
(TNK) If p, believe that you are thinking that p But there's no more reason to suppose that TNK can be transparently and non-circularly applied than either BEL or DES. In order to be in a position to apply TNK, you must be thinking (merely entertaining the proposition) that p; but in order to have reason to apply TNK (to do what its consequent tells you to), you must know that you're in that position. Hence, you must know that you're thinking that p in order to conclude that you're thinking that p.
Comparison of BEL and TNK is telling. Given that their antecedents are the same, it's imperative that one know what kind of cognitive contact one has made with the content of the antecedent. Otherwise, one wouldn't know which rule to apply, and which consequent to detach.
Further, TNK lacks a feature that gave BEL (and DES) whatever initial plausibility they may have had. For if one takes BEL's antecedent to record the result of an act of looking outward to determine the way (non-mental) And one must assign a particular meaning to an utterance if it is to provide evidence of the content of the thinking. In short, the inner utterance must be understood. 23 But understanding the inner utterance is just thinking what it means, and so already involves thinking that p. Thus,
given that one must in general know that applicability conditions hold, the account of selfknowledge of thinking based on THINK-THAT is viciously circular.
A further problem for extrospectionist theories of self-knowledge of intentional states is how to account for knowledge of content itself. In order to successfully apply a transparent epistemic rule, one must know not only what one's attitude toward the antecedent is, but what its content is as well. 24 Knowledge of both is required in order to justify self-ascription of the 23 What if the inner voice says "You can take that stock to the bank"? Shall I conclude that I'm thinking that I can take a cow to the river, or that I can count on some shares of ownership in a company paying dividends? 24 In fact I'm skeptical of immediate introspective knowledge of propositional attitudes such as belief and desire, since I think a functionalist account of believing is correct (and functional properties are not introspectable), and since (for familiar Freudian reasons) one can be wrong about what one believes or desires. It seems to me more plausible that one can have immediate introspective knowledge of acceptance (or affirmation -seeming to believe) or attitude of the consequent. If I don't know that it's p that I recognize or think (or ϕing that I find desirable), I won't be justified in concluding that it's p that I believe or think (or ϕing that I want to do). Knowledge of content is built in to BEL, DES, and THINK-THAT. But one might just as well wonder how one knows what the contents of one's thoughts, beliefs and desires are. BEL and DES are focused on the attitudinal components of their respective state types, as evidenced by the fact that their application conditions presuppose knowledge of propositional content, and are stated in terms of what is true or desirable. They don't provide any explanation of how it is that one knows the contents of one's intentional states.
So, presumably, we would need some other sort of rule to apply in order to explain how one knows that one is recognizing or thinking that p (and not that q), or that one wants to ϕ (and not to ψ), and we would need to specify the conditions under which such a rule would be applicable. Using BEL and DES as models, a rule of the form CONT seems a likely proposal (CONT) If φ, then believe that the content of your intentional state is that p 25 where φ is the non-psychological object one looks to, and the conditions under which one is to apply CONT specify the property of this object that indicates that it's the content of one's intentional state. But what should the object be, and what is the relevant property? In the case of BEL, the object is (as the use of a propositional variable indicates) a proposition, and the property that indicates that one believes it is truth: if you ask yourself how things are with the world, and you judge that p is a fact (a true proposition), then it's reasonable to conclude that you attraction (seeming to desire), and that these sorts of "quasi-attitudes" are prima facie, Given that propositions are intentional contents, it would seem that one would have to judge that it is the proposition that p. That is, one would simply have to identify it as the proposition it is. But this assumes that propositions have properties that we are able to detect, and on the basis of which we can discriminate them (just as, on the extrospectionist view, knowing the sensory content of one's perceptual experience assumes that one can discriminate its ... our point of contact with our own thoughts is through their content: what it is we are thinking. We have a privileged and exclusive access to our own thoughts through acquaintance with their propositional content.
Hence, to think (merely entertain) a thought is simply to be acquainted with its content, and acquaintance with a content entails awareness of its distinctiveness. Now, one might well wonder how one could be acquainted with (what is presumably) an abstract object (as well as how one could be exclusively acquainted with it, given that it is public). Dretske dismisses such qualms -too quickly, in my view. (He says that being acquainted with a proposition is simply knowing the content of one's thought. But this is unhelpful, given that knowledge of content is explained in terms of acquaintance with a proposition.) If there is to be a plausible extrospectionist account of knowledge of content along these lines, we're owed some sort of explanation of our access to propositions and their properties. In the case of perception, we have our sense organs and their causal transactions with the physical world: we know how we're experiencing (representing) things by inference from their perceived properties, which we can distinguish with our selectively sensitive sensory apparatuses (or so the extrospectionist story goes). Should we say then that we have a special faculty that allows us to peer into Platonic Heaven, and to pick out a particular abstract object, 
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My own view is that acquaintance with the intentional contents of one's thoughts works in the same way as acquaintance with the sensational contents of one's sensory experiences.
Experiences in general instantiate and are individuated by phenomenal properties. One 26 Naturalists are not, per se, nominalists. The program of "naturalizing content" is inaptly named. It's the expression relation between contents and brain states that's the target of this program, where contents are almost universally taken to be mind-and language-independent abstract objects (propositions). (See, e.g., Fodor 1990, note 6.) Equally, it's the acquaintance relation between contents and brain states that must be naturalized. No spooky extra-sensory powers of discernment, whether of abstract objects or immaterial qualia, are to be sanctioned. (Still, you might wonder why someone who countenances abstract objects would balk at other kinds of immaterials.) 27 Here's a story that I think won't work. I know that I'm thinking that the sky is blue because I see that the sky is blue. Propositions are property complexes, and property instances can be detected in perception. But, first, how on this account is the thought that the sky is blue to be distinguished from the perceptual state of seeing that it's blue? And, second, not all that one is thinking on the basis of such acquaintance-knowledge.
I close this discussion of extrospectionism by noting that non-transparency and circularity problems of the sorts discussed above affect extrospectionist theories of self-knowledge of perceptual (experiential) content, as well. For notice that the puzzle of transparency arises as much for such theories as it does for extrospectionist theories of knowledge of thought, belief and desire. PER is, ostensibly, as bad as BEL:
(PER) If x is F, then your experience is representing x as F for, of course, that x is F constitutes no reason at all to believe that anyone is experiencing anything. And, as in the case of BEL, the presumptive remedy would be to specify conditions under which application of PER would yield knowledge of perceptual content. The obvious suggestion is that it be the case that it (perceptually) seems to you that x is F. But then the same problem arises in the application of PER as does for BEL. In order not merely to be in the circumstances that license application of PER, but to have reason to apply PER, one would need to know that x seems to one to be F. And, again, knowing how something seems is knowing something, not about an external object, but about one's experience of it. So PER is not transparent. Moreover, knowing that x seems to one to be F is already knowing that one perceptually represents it to be F (or, at least, is as close as finding ϕing desirable and wanting to ϕ are); so applying PER requires that one already have the knowledge its application is supposed to deliver.
I conclude, therefore, that extrospectionist theories of self-knowledge pose no serious threat to PITT. Which is not to say that PITT is without problems. In the remainder of this paper I discuss one in particular that strikes me as, prima facie anyway potentially serious.
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V.
Here's the worry. You might think that all of the phenomenal properties of a conscious occurrent state are, at least potentially (one might have to attend to it, really hard, for a long time, repeatedly), available to the individual who's in it. That is, you might think that there can be no phenomenal feature of a conscious experience which is in principle introspectively undetectable.
Conscious phenomenology is the introspectable: it's the surface of our minds; the only point of direct contact we have with ourselves; the very substance of consciousness. And just as you 29 Thanks to congregants Charles Siewert and Terry Horgan, as well as the Infidel Joe Levine, for very helpful discussion of the issues in sections II through IV. might think that we ought to be able to perceive all the perceivable features of the surfaces of external objects (the only points of direct perceptual contact we have with them), you might think it equally tautologous that we ought to be able to introspect all the introspectable features of occurrent conscious states. We may not be omniscient with respect to our minds; but we ought to be (something close to) omniscient (in principle) with respect to our conscious minds. And if you thought all of this, you might wonder how it could be that the intentional content of a conscious occurrent thought could be identified with its phenomenal character, when in fact we are pretty lousy at identifying the contents of our thoughts -because in particular we are pretty lousy at identifying the contents of their constituent concepts.
I take myself to be consciously thinking, for example, that I know that Hell is other people. 30 Well, if the intentional content of the thought is cognitive-phenomenological, and it's compositional, then it's determined by the cognitive-phenomenal content of its constituent concepts. In particular, the content of the concept KNOWLEDGE is cognitivephenomenological. So, if I can know introspectively that I'm thinking that I know that Hell is other people, I ought to be able to know introspectively what the content of the concept KNOWLEDGE is. And if that content is just a kind of conscious phenomenology, all on the inner surface, so to speak, I ought to be able to determine introspectively what it is. But I can't say what the content of the concept KNOWLEDGE is. Indeed, it doesn't look like anyone can.
Likewise for all the other concepts that confound our efforts at understanding: TRUTH, JUSTICE, LOVE, RIGHTNESS, etc.
In sum, if there are conceptual contents that are introspectively unknowable, then it can't 30 Maybe it's just other philosophers.
be that the contents of concepts, and, hence, of thoughts, are phenomenally constituted: PITT must be wrong.
An easy response to the problem is to claim that it requires that concepts be analyzable, Here are a few possibilities.
In fact, it's not clear that all the contents of conscious experience must be equally available to the experiencer. Introspective knowledge requires introspective attention, and the capacities for conscious experience and introspective attention to it are distinct. Perhaps it is, then, not implausible that the resolving power of introspective attention might be insufficient to discern all the fine-grained details of conscious experience. There might be features of our conscious experience that we simply can't make out introspectively -just as there might be details of a visually represented scene that we can't quite make out, no matter how closely we look. Our experience is fully determinate in its details, but reporting all those details requires a fineness of discernment -of attention -that we just don't have.
Or maybe the scope of introspective attention is limited -it's like a kind of inner foveating, where (at least) the finer details of what's beyond the center of attention aren't accessible, hence not reportable (as the unattended ticking of a clock, the song stuck in one's head, the road one is driving on). Perhaps there are sectors of the field of our conscious experience that are simply out of the neurologically determined range of the "inner fovea" (just as we can't see what's behind us merely by turning our eyes). So then it could be that when one can't say what the complete content of one's concept is, it's because one isn't -or perhaps can't be -focusing on the whole thing at once.
I don't find either of these suggestions very plausible. For one thing, it doesn't seem that inability to discern beyond a certain fineness of grain, even if we have such a limitation, is the problem in the case of concepts like KNOWLEDGE and JUSTICE. There seem, rather, to be substantive pieces missing. Supposing that knowledge is F justified true belief, it seems unlikely that F is some fine detail of the concept JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF that we simply can't make out. It seems like something more substantive is missing -a constituent of the same level of grain as justification, truth and belief.
Yet, it's also hard to believe that the missing piece is missing because, though it's of the same scale and grain as the others, and equally conscious, we simply can't "foveate" on it, and so underneath and above, etc.) . Can't we similarly direct our inner attention all over the place, as it were scouring our conscious inner landscape? It seems odd -that is to say, unmotivated -that there should be places we can't look that just happen to be where we find ourselves at a loss with respect to KNOWLEDGE, TRUTH, JUSTICE, and the rest.
So let's try something else. Maybe in cases of incomplete accessibility one is consciously entertaining only part of the concept the relevant term expresses in one's language, the rest being unconscious, and hence introspectively inaccessible. This is different from the previous strategy, according to which the whole concept is conscious, but you just can't discern a part of it. In this case there's nothing to consciously introspectively attend to. Part of the concept is, as it were, "submerged In response, I maintain that you can't possess concepts you don't completely grasp.
Burge is a very subtle and resourceful philosopher, and has argued for his anti-individualist thesis in subtly different ways on different occasions. I don't have the space here to examine all of them; but it does seem clear to me that the most influential presentation of the thesis, the one that almost everyone cites in defense of their allegiance to the basic tenets of externalism -the one in "Individualism and the Mental" -is fatally flawed. In brief, the problem is this. The lynchpin of the anti-individualist argument in that paper is the thesis that belief attributions it is intuitively natural to make to individuals, based on their sincere avowals, ought to be construed as literally true, all things equal. Hence, if someone (call him Art) sincerely utters the sentence 'my arthritis has spread to my thigh', we who are in the know about where one can and cannot (as a matter of conceptual necessity) have arthritis will nonetheless describe him as believing that his arthritis has spread to his thigh. We describe his conceptual error using our words, with the contents they have in our linguistic community; and since this is the overwhelmingly natural way to describe his mistake, we take it to be literally true. But if it's literally true, then Art has our concept ARTHRITIS (he can't have ARTHRITIS beliefs without it) in spite of his misunderstanding of it.
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The intuitive power of Burge's thought experiment derives from the observation that it is -pretheoretically, innocently, commonsensically, overwhelmingly -natural to describe errors such as Art's using the very words the ascribee does not completely understand, without supposing that we are using them with anything but their ordinary meanings for us. Burge's (1979: 91) parenthetical comment that he is "not convinced" that someone who believes that 'orangutan' is a word for a fruit drink and says "An orangutan is a fruit drink" shouldn't therefore be taken to mean that an orangutan is a fruit drink and think that an orangutan is a fruit drink is, I believe, strong evidence that the argument for anti-individualism in this paper is based on the principle that the intuitively natural way to describe someone's mental state, on the basis of the words they use (even mistakenly), is literally true. (Burge has since come to reconsider the emphasis he places on belief ascriptions in this paper (see Burge 2007) , and has changed his mind about the orangutan example (personal conversation).) his conceptual confusion, and without intending that our words have nonstandard meanings, can't be construed as literally true, and where it's clearly not our intention that it be so construed.
Here's just one.
Little Simone is taken to the zoo, having been told that, among other fun things, she will get to ride a big escalator. (It's the Bronx Zoo. I seem to remember a big escalator out of the subway, or something.) After passing a number of cages containing large animals, Simone asks, excitedly: "Which one's the escalator? When do I get to ride it?" It seems entirely natural to describe Simone as having mistakenly believed that escalators are animals. This is a perfectly intuitive way to describe the mistake she made. "Ha, ha, ha!" we say, "Simone thinks elevators are animals! Isn't she cute?" (We routinely describe children's errors in is way: "When she was little, Lotta thought garter snakes were something you wear!"; "As a child, Linus thought guerillas were apes!") But surely we don't think that Simone was thinking that escalators are animals: "Really?" the tone-deaf philosopher asks, "You're saying that she thought that mechanical stairways for the vertical transport of pedestrians are biological entities of the Kingdom Metazoa ?" "Well, of course not," we reply. "She obviously doesn't know what an escalator is. She wasn't thinking that at all!" Well, if she wasn't thinking that, then what exactly was her conceptual error? We don't mean to be attributing to her either such sophisticated, or conceptually incoherent beliefs. Even though on a literal interpretation of what we say, this is what we're doing. We use our words with their literal meanings, but we don't intend what we say about Simone to be literally true of her.
But isn't it equally obvious that Art doesn't know what arthritis is? And that, therefore, in describing his error we don't mean to be attributing to him the (by our lights) contradictory belief that a disease that can't occur in his thigh has spread to his thigh? So why is this not a reason not take our description to be literally true of him? And this in spite of the fact that it's intuitively entirely natural to describe his error using the words he doesn't understand? It remains intuitively natural to use the very words the confused have used even when it's perfectly clear that we don't think that what we say is literally true of them. So the fact that it's intuitively natural to describe Art as believing that his arthritis has spread to his thigh tells us nothing about whether or not he has our concept ARTHRITIS. We certainly don't mean to say that.
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If a concept is a thing with constituents, and you don't possess all of the constituents, then you don't possess the concept. So if KNOWLEDGE has more constituents than JUSTIFIED, TRUE and BELIEF, but those three are all the constituents you possess, then you don't possess the concept KNOWLEDGE, and you can't think that you know anything. And if you can't think that you know anything, then it's not surprising that you can't introspectively know that you think you know anything. The content isn't there to be introspected. If you were really consciously thinking it (and it's not primitive) then you ought to be able to say what it is.
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I think that it might, in fact, not often be the case that we're saying exactly what we're 32 I develop a critique of Burgean anti-individualism in much greater depth and detail in Pitt MS2. 33 It is pretty weird that we can know that we don't know what knowledge is. If we don't have an analysis of knowledge, then how do we know when we get it wrong? What are we comparing candidate analyses to when we see that they come up short? Are our intuitions responsive to a complete but inaccessible (because unconscious?) analysis?
It's a paradox of analysis. If you can tell when you've gotten an analysis right, then you must already know what the analysandum means; in which case the analysis is pointless. On the other hand, if you can tell when you haven't gotten an analysis right, then, again, you must already know what the analysandum means; in which case it's a mystery why you can't get the analysis right. Maybe most of us don't have cognitive lives nearly as differentiated as our vocabularies would suggest. And maybe we don't have nearly as much in common with each other, cognitively, as our shared language would suggest. We get by in communication and interaction provided the differences in the contents of our thoughts aren't sufficient to derail whatever projects we may have going, or want to begin, with others. But each of us is in his own little semantic bubble, blissfully unaware that we're by and large talking past each other.
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The way past the objection I've considered thus has far-reaching consequences, some of which may seem unacceptable. We often, perhaps typically, don't think what we say, and don't say what we think; nor do we often agree in what we think, even if we agree on what words we ought to use to express it. None of this bothers me much. In fact, I am inclined to think that linguistic meaning -conceived of as a fixed, mind-independent assignment of unique semantic values to expression types of a language, which all speakers get hooked up to in the same way in virtue of shared intentions to obey certain conventions, or in virtue of happening to have grown 34 Maybe this wouldn't be too hard for a philosopher to accept. up in a place where by and large people tend to make the same kinds of noises -is a will-o'-thewisp. This is not to say that my words as I use them don't have meanings for me, derived from the thoughts and concepts I use them to express. (Nor is it to say that the concepts I express by my words don't have constituent structures that are accessible to me in conscious introspection, or that you and I never think or say the same thing.) Indeed, it's because my words as I use them have meanings that derive from the thoughts and concepts I use them to express that it's at best an idealization to speak of a unique, determinate, shared system of linguistic meaning for a community of speakers.
I think this is a consequence of taking seriously the idea (which I take very seriously) that linguistic intentionality is derived from cognitive intentionality. If cognitive intentionality is phenomenal, and phenomenal properties are not intersubjectively accessible, then knowledge of So, on the internalist theory of meaning I'm defending here, language is a much bigger mess than one might have hoped. Maybe any ostensible "language" (English, Spanish, Tagalog) is too big a mess to succumb to one set of theoretical generalizations. Indeed, some linguists (including the Linguist, I believe) have said that there really is no such thing as English, Spanish or Tagalog (from either a syntactic or semantic point of view), but only collections of more or less similar dialects -or perhaps even idiolects. For my own reasons, I think this is probably right. We ought not to assume that an individual's apparent competence with a given set of syntactic-phonological types is an indication that he has internalized the same unique, determinate system of linguistic meaning as anyone else who is apparently competent with that same set of syntactic-phonological types.
Ite Missa Est.
